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Climate change, increasing demand for water, higher environmental standards and inelastic
water supply suggest that future drought response in Southern Europe would require more
efﬁcient management of water use. In this context, there is a pressing need for a better
understanding of the economic impacts of irrigation restrictions, including their microeco-
nomic and broad economic repercussions. This paper connects a multi-attribute Revealed
Preference Model working at an agricultural district level with a regionally calibrated supply
and use model that combines nonlinear programming and input-output modeling techniques
to address water allocation issues. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time these two
modeling approaches are combined in this fashion.Methods are illustrated with an application
to the Lower Po River Basin (LPRB) in the Emilia Romagna Region, Italy. Results show that
irrigation restrictions generate rising incremental losses in the agricultural districts of the
LPRB, which are ampliﬁed through negative inter-sectorial feedbacks at a regional level.
Contraction of production in Emilia Romagna results in an excess demand situation that
propels the production of substitute goods elsewhere in Italy, partially but not fully
This is an Open Access article published by World Scientiﬁc Publishing Company. It is distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY) License. Further distribution of
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compensating economic losses in the region. Methods and results offer a basis for assessing
tradeoffs in irrigation restrictions and related adaptations, for climate change included.
Keywords: Mathematical programming; input-output modeling; irrigation restrictions; Po
River Basin.
1. Introduction
Southern Europe is becoming drier. A hotter and more volatile climate will reduce
rain-fed crop yields, and farmers are likely to extend irrigationwhile seeking to adapt.
With high conﬁdence, water demand for irrigating crops is expected to increase by
more than 40% by 2080 (IPCC 2014), accelerating the observed expansion in irri-
gation infrastructure over the past 50 years (EEA 2009). Declining average water
availability will be insufﬁcient to meet the growing irrigation demand (IPCC 2014).
More frequent and intense droughts (EC 2012) will further aggravate the supply-
demand imbalance, and so will the more stringent environmental (e.g., ecological
ﬂow) standards (EC 2000). As the competition among economic water uses tightens
up, and the costs of exploiting new water sources increase, it is generally expected
that water restrictions and rationing will be put in place more often (OECD 2014). In
this context, there is a pressing need to better understand the economic impacts of
irrigation restrictions, including their micro- and macro-economic implications (UN
2016). Decision support systems, notably systems analysis, could play a useful role in
this regard. Building on recent advances in systems analysis, this research develops a
modeling framework that captures the rationale behind farmers’ behavior and
responses, and represents the complex interactions among sectors and regions within
an economy, with the aim of predicting both the local and broad economic reper-
cussions of irrigation constraints.
Systems analysis has become in recent decades an increasingly important tool for
supporting water resources management (Girard et al. 2015). Systems analysis
captures interconnections between elements of a system, thus allowing the use of a
logical procedure involving mathematical constructs to model supply-demand in-
terplay for assessing the costs and beneﬁts of alternative management strategies,
following agronomic, hydrological or economic criteria, or a combination thereof
(hybrid approaches, e.g., hydro-economic) (Feldman 1992; Harou et al. 2009; Singh
2012). Economic objectives and constraints have been used in systems analysis since
the 1960s (Maass et al. 1962), and have gained importance ever since. The increasing
prominence of economics in water resources management came as a reaction to the
incremental costs of conventional engineering approaches, which eventually led to
inelastic water supply in several basins and called for a better understanding and
representation of the water demand dynamics and its drivers (Randall 1981).
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
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Two categories of economic models are typically used in water resources
management: micro- and macroeconomic. Microeconomic modeling analyzes the
pattern of yields, revenues and costs at a farm or (agricultural/irrigation) district
scale (representative farmer). Farmers’ decisions determine crop mix and timing,
water application and (investments in) capital stock, to optimize1 farm performance
with respect to a single or multiple objectives, within a domain deﬁned by a
number of constraints. Most models rely on single-attribute objective functions that
maximize the utility derived from proﬁt. This is the case of Expected Utility (ExU),
Linear Programming (LP) and Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP).
However, single-attribute utility functions appear to be inconsistent with observed
farmers’ behavior and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), suggesting that
decision-making is driven by multiple attributes of objects (including but not
limited to proﬁt) and farmers’ beliefs (Läpple and Kelley 2013; Poppenborg and
Koellner 2013). Normative ExU models also present issues with ex-post validation
that have prompted criticism (Rabin and Kőszegi 2007; Rabin and Thaler 2001).
Notably, Chambers and Quiggin (2000) have argued that the standard approach to
represent choice under uncertainty is “inﬂexible and, in important respects, unre-
alistic,” and propose using models that rely on the state-contingent notion (see
e.g., Adamson et al. 2007; Adamson and Loch 2014; Mallawaarachchi et al.
2008). Inductive LP and PMP models, on the other hand, present problems with
calibration. LP demands many constraints that often lead to corner solutions or
abrupt discontinuities in agents’ responses, and attempts to avoid overspecializa-
tion introducing additional restrictions (McCarl 1982) that result in “overly con-
strained” models (Graveline 2016). PMP models address this shortcoming through
dual variables of calibration constraints to “specify a non-linear objective function
such that observed activity levels are reproduced by the optimal solution”
(Heckelei and Britz 2005); yet, the economic or technological rationale behind the
nonlinear terms in the objective function remains unclear and does not inform on
the drivers behind observed choices (Heckelei et al. 2012).
By building on the axioms of revealed preference (Houthakker 1950;
Samuelson 1938), it is possible to construct Revealed Preference Models (RPM)
that are both consistent with observed choices and suitable as a basis for empirical
analysis — thus addressing the tradeoff between the model’s capability to deliver
numerical results for policy evaluation and its coherence with economic theory and
principles (Afriat 1967; Diewert 1973). RPM also feature multi-attribute objective
1An alternative to optimization is simulation. However, the usual approach to solving water man-
agement problems by means of economics is optimization (Graveline 2016; Harou et al. 2009; Singh
2012).
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functions that are consistent with ex-post evidence and the TPB (Gómez-Limón
et al. 2016). Although revealed preference principles have been mostly used in
economic theory (Varian 2006), empirical analyses have been conducted for
decades now (Varian 2012). The seminal work by Gutiérrez-Martín and Gómez
(2011) has applied revealed preference principles to water resources management
and farm modeling, and a number of applications have since been developed
(Gutiérrez-Martín et al. 2014; Pérez-Blanco et al. 2016, 2015).
Macroeconomic modeling examines dynamics of aggregate quantities such as
goods and services produced, income, capital employment, and prices at the re-
gional (Carrera et al. 2015; Dixon et al. 2011), national (Bosello et al. 2012; Ciscar
et al. 2011) and global levels (Hertel 1997; Lenzen et al. 2013). The two most
commonly used models for assessing the broad economic impacts of environ-
mental changes are Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) and Input-Output (IO)
models. In CGE models, agent behavior is calibrated from observed economic
ﬂows registered in Social Accounting Matrices. These models often follow a
Walrasian framework, where investments are saving-driven and agents minimize
private expenditure to attain a given utility level. Competition for water can be
represented either implicitly (irrigated land, which itself embodies water) or ex-
plicitly. The latter approach is used, e.g., by Darwin et al. (1995) for the US,
although replication of this approach elsewhere can be challenging due to limited
information on water use, value and prices. On top of that, the shadow price of
water may not meet the gap between irrigated and rain-fed production to pay for
the returns to water. Accordingly, in Berrittella et al. (2007), irrigated land pro-
duction is represented by using a nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
function in which water and other inputs enter in a ﬁxed proportion. Water demand
responds to a water rent, which in turn derives from supply constraints. Calzadilla
et al. (2011) use a more ﬂexible three-level CES production function, which allows
for different degrees of substitutability between inputs at each level and permits
two ways of reallocating water: substituting other inputs for water and reducing
demand for water intensive products. Yet, since rain-fed and irrigated production
appear as part of the same aggregate national production function, it is not possible
to stop irrigating an area in favor of rain-fed agriculture — a major weakness that
complicates policy assessment (e.g., irrigation restrictions).
IO models, on the other hand, reﬂect the economic interdependencies between
sectors and regions within an economy, through intermediate supply and ﬁnal
demand, based on linear relations (Koks et al. 2015). Linear IO models applied to
water typically combine input-output matrices and water accounts and apply a
structural decomposition analysis that disaggregates the effects of a given shock on
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
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economic outputs and water use at different levels, from urban (Wang et al. 2009)
to multi-regional (Wan et al. 2016). Because of their descriptive nature, researchers
have frequently resorted to IO models to determine which sectors consume more
water (directly and indirectly) (Bogra et al. 2016), estimate their productivity
(apparent and induced) (Duarte et al. 2002), assess their exposure and vulnerability
to shortages (Zhao et al. 2015), and support the design of water and agricultural
policy (González 2011; Llop 2008). Despite much progress, linear IO models still
tackle two major issues insufﬁciently: (i) disruptions, such as droughts, are most
often a disruption in the supply-side of the production chain; and (ii) modeling the
substitution capabilities of other regions and/or other industries. Nonlinear opti-
mization has been combined with IO modeling techniques to overcome these
issues, thus providing the simplicity of IO modeling (i.e., Leontief production
function) while allowing for some more ﬂexibility (Baghersad and Zobel 2015;
Oosterhaven and Bouwmeester 2016). One such approach can be found in the
MultiRegional Impact Assessment (MRIA) model (Koks and Thissen 2016). With
the use of the MRIA model, the ﬁrst aforementioned issue is tackled by using
optimization techniques to solve the model, which allows for taking endogenous
import and supply constraints into account in an essentially demand-determined
model. This overcomes two potential concerns: (i) the need for translating the
supply-side shock into a demand-side shock and (ii) the need for using a supply-
driven IO model. The second issue is tackled by introducing (multiregional)
substitution possibilities, i.e., allowing products to be produced by different in-
dustries in the same or other regions. This approach allows for an endogenously
determined new post-disaster optimum with shifts between main suppliers within
the boundaries of the existing (trade and) production structure of the (regional)
economy.
Micro- and macroeconomic concepts can be operationalized in systems analysis
through stand-alone economic models or hybrid models. Most hybrid models
combine microeconomic and engineering models by using a holistic or modular
approach (Harou et al. 2009). Holistic approaches typically represent farmer be-
havior by using piecewise exogenous beneﬁt functions that relate water use to
proﬁt, and then solve both models together to represent causal relationships and
interdependencies. Modular approaches run the two models independently in a
recursive or sequential fashion, which increases the probability of convergence on
an optimal solution and the level of detail in each sub-ﬁeld (Heinz et al. 2007;
Singh 2012). Computationally demanding macroeconomic models are typically
run independently, and combined with other models (e.g., engineering models)
using a modular approach (see e.g., Grames et al. 2016). Although micro- and
Economic Impacts of Irrigation-Constrained Agriculture in the Lower Po Basin
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macroeconomic models have been widely used to inform drought management,
water management typically relies on one or the other, and connected micro- and
macroeconomic models are rare (Pérez-Blanco et al. 2016). This leaves the
policy-maker facing a choice between two models offering complementary
outputs.
One obvious solution to this tradeoff is to solve both models independently,
where available, and use their outputs to inform water policy. This may not be as
straightforward as it seems since the foundations of both approaches (individual
behavior in narrowly deﬁned markets versus structure and behavior of a whole
economy) can lead to conﬂicting results (Pindyck 2015). Using a holistic approach
to nest micro- and macroeconomic models is challenging, as the two follow their
own internal optimization procedures, and making them compatible may demand
oversimpliﬁcation (e.g., piecewise functions) (Harou et al. 2009). This paper
presents a methodological framework that utilizes a modular approach to connect,
in a sequential fashion, a multi-attribute RPM with a macroeconomic MRIA
model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time the two models are
connected in this fashion. The methods presented in this paper aim to offer policy
makers a policy assessment tool that combines the advantages of the two models
while guaranteeing consistency. Figure 1 presents a diagram that describes the two
models and how they are connected.
This modeling framework is used to assess the microeconomic and broad
economic impacts of seasonal irrigation restrictions in two stages: in the ﬁrst stage,
the multi-attribute RPM is calibrated and a series of simulations is run to estimate
Figure 1. The Modeling Framework
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
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the impacts of irrigation restrictions on the income of farmers; in the second stage,
estimated income impacts are adapted and imported into the MRIA model to
calculate the broad economic repercussions across sectors and regions. The exer-
cise is illustrated with an application to the Lower Po River Basin (LPRB) in north-
eastern Italy. Despite its growing drought exposure and inﬂating agricultural losses
(PRBDA 2015), drought management in the Po River Basin has hitherto been
informed through a hydrological model that does not include information on the
economic impact of irrigation restrictions. This may be leading to inappropriate
drought responses (Mysiak et al. 2014). By means of a thorough representation of
farmers’ preferences, related responses and their broad economic repercussions,
this research can be used to estimate the abatement costs of droughts. Authors
intend to leverage on this research and its outcomes, in order to strengthen ongoing
collaboration with basin authorities and explore the development of a hydro-eco-
nomic model based on sound micro- and macroeconomic principles.2
2. The Lower Po River Basin, Italy
The LPRB is located at the northeast area of the Italian Peninsula. It comprises the
mid- and downstream part of the Po River and its sub-basins Trebbia, Nure,
Chiavenna, Arda-Ongina, Taro, Parma, Enza, Crostolo, Secchia and Panaro. The
LPRB spreads throughout the administrative provinces Piacenza, Parma, Reggio
Emilia (entirely); Modena, Ferrara (most of its territory); and Bologna (marginally)
in the Emilia Romagna Region; and the southernmost part of the Veneto Region3
(see Fig. 1). The LPRB comprises the Po Delta Nature Park, a biosphere reserve of
UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere Programme, and a World Heritage site
(UNESCO 1999). Irrigated areas are comprised in 30 Agricultural Districts (ADs)
(see Fig. 2). ADs are clusters of municipalities with similar climatic, geological,
topographical and agricultural characteristics. For the scope of our analysis, the
ADs are considered autonomous agents in the multi-attribute RPM. Most relevant
crops in the area are wheat and corn. Other important crops include other cereals,
fruit trees and vineyards (ER Statistica 2014).
The Po River Basin has been frequently affected by drought events since the
turn of the century. Droughts occurred in 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2015, and a
2Because of the sensitive nature of the information supplied by the hydrological model used in the
LPRB, its methods and some of the model outcomes are not publicly available, and could not be used
in this research.
3The administrative division into regions and provinces in Italy corresponds to the second and third
level of the Nomenclature des Unites Territoriales Statistiques (NUTS), or nomenclature of territorial
units for statistics. NUTS classiﬁcation is a hierarchical system for statistical subdivision of the EU
(Eurostat 2016).
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nationwide state of emergency (SoE) was declared in 2003, 2006 and 2007 for a
total duration of 20 months (PRBDA 2015). Economic consequences of droughts
were heavily felt in the irrigated areas of the LPRB. Environmental uses in the
LPRB, and in the Po Delta in particular, were affected by sharply decreased
discharges and saline intrusion that affected drinking water supplies (Mysiak et al.
2014). Climate and hydrological models indicate that such events may occur more
often in the future as a result of climate change. The spring peak of annual water
discharge is projected to shift from May to April, which, combined with reduced
precipitation and discharge in spring and summer, will extend and intensify the
hydrological dry season and increase water stress over the basin (up to þ25% in
this century according to estimations) (Coppola et al. 2014; Medri et al. 2013;
Vezzoli et al. 2015).
Figure 2. The Lower Po River Basin
11. Montagna del Medio Trebbia ; 2. Alto Nure ; 3. Colline del Trebbia e del Tidone ; 4. Colline del
Nure e dell’Arda ; 5. Pianura di Piacenza ; 6. Basso Arda ; 7. Alto Taro ; 8. Alto Parma ; 9. Colline di
Salsomaggiore ; 10. Medio Parma ; 11. Pianura di Busseto ; 12. Pianura di Parma ; 13. Montagna tra
l’Alto Enza e Alto Dolo ; 14. Colline tra Enza e Secchia ; 15. Bassa Reggiana ; 16. Pianura di Reggio
Emilia ; 17. Valli del Dragone e del Rossenna ; 18. Alto Panaro ; 19. Colline Modenesi ; 20. Bassa
Modenese ; 21. Pianura di Carpi ; 22. Pianura di Modena ; 23. Montagna del Medio Reno ; 24. Alto
Reno ; 25. Colline di Bologna ; 26. Colline del Reno ; 27. Pianura a sinistra del Reno ; 28. Pianura di
Ferrara ; 29. Boniﬁca Ferrarese Occidentale ; 30. Boniﬁca Ferrarese Orientale.
2I. Piedmont; II. Lombardy; III. Trentino-Alto Adige; IV. Veneto; V. Friuli-Venezia Giulia; VI.
Liguria; VII. Emilia-Romagna (LPRB); VIII. Tuscany; IX. Emilia Romagna (other area); X. Umbria;
XI. Marche; XII. Lazio; XIII. Abruzzo; XIV. Campania; XV. Molise; XVI. Apulia; XVII. Basilicata;
XVIII. Regio Calabria; XIX. Sicily; XX. Sardinia.
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
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Despite the medium to long term planning instruments provided for by Italian
legislation,4 drought management in the basin relies on reactive measures enacted
during drought episodes (Calliari 2011). Traditionally, drought response has fol-
lowed a command-and-control approach in which the Civil Protection Department
(CPD, in Italian: Dipartimento Protezione Civile) adopts speciﬁc water restrictions
for each use, with sanctions imposed for non-compliance (GU 1994). The 2003
drought event opened the way for establishing a coordinated approach, in which
water restrictions are deﬁned through consensual participatory processes in the
context of a Drought Steering Committee (DSC, in Italian: Cabina di Regia).
Promoted by the Po RBA, the DSC engages regional administrations; several Land
Reclamation and Irrigation Boards; public entities supervising the operation of the
great regulated lakes; the Italian Grid Distribution Operator; and major power
producing companies located in the basin. The DSC builds upon the voluntary
engagement of the main interested sectors, aiming to coordinate with one another
so as to delay or prevent critical water shortages.
During the 2003 drought event, one of the most intense of the past 30 years, the
DSC conducted negotiations that led to a 25–50% reduction in irrigation allot-
ments and increased water releases from alpine reservoirs and large regulated lakes
(PRBA 2003). Although insufﬁcient to restore the balance in the basin, the deci-
sion led to a progressive increase in water ﬂows in the Po River. Given the positive
experience, the DSC was instituted as a permanent coordination mechanism for
monitoring and managing water crises (PRBA 2005).
3. Revealed Preference Model
3.1. Decision-making problem
Agents aim to maximize utility, which in turn derives from the provision of
valuable attributes. One such attribute is proﬁt, but there can be others, e.g.,
avoidance of risk or management complexities. The question of which attributes
are valuable, and to what extent, is conditioned by agents’ preferences — a
summary of psychological assessments determined by their beliefs (Läpple and
Kelley 2013). The theory of revealed preferences shows that it is possible to elicit
agents’ preferences by paying attention to observed decisions and realized out-
comes (in particular, the observed provision of attributes). In the case of irrigation,
the range of farmers’ choices includes selection of crops and their rotation, water
4These include for instance the Water Protection Plans mandated by Legislative Decree 152/99 and
the Programs of Local Action to ﬁght Drought and Desertiﬁcation (PAL, in Italian: Piano di Azione
Locale) envisaged by the Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning’s (in Italian: Comitato
interministeriale per la programmazione economica) resolution 229/99.
Economic Impacts of Irrigation-Constrained Agriculture in the Lower Po Basin
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application and capital stock. This complex decision process can be simpliﬁed by
representing each possible combination of crops and management techniques
(involving timing, water application and capital) for which information is available
(a ﬁnite set) as a separate crop with unique characteristics. Thus, the optimization
problem is reduced to a decision on the crop mix within a domain (Gutiérrez-
Martín and Gómez 2011):
MaxUðxÞ
x
¼ Uðz1ðxÞ; z2ðxÞ; z3ðxÞ . . . zmðxÞÞ ð1Þ
s:t: :0  xi  1 ð2ÞXn
i¼1
xi ¼ 1, ð3Þ
x 2 FðxÞ, ð4Þ
z ¼ zðxÞ 2 Rm: ð5Þ
Agents decide on the crop mix x 2 Rn, where x is a vector containing the share of
the surface area devoted to each crop xiði ¼ 1, . . . , nÞ. Every crop i has a unique
combination of attributes zðxÞ attached. All attributes are normalized dividing by
the maximum feasible value, resulting in quantities of dimension one. Increasing
the provision of one attribute, all things being equal, has a positive impact on
farmers’ utility (“more is better”). This means that the rationale of agents’ choices,
rather than lying in crop decisions themselves, lies in the set of utility-relevant
attributes considered. Agents balance the crop mix so as to maximize the utility
derived from the provision of attributes subject to a series of agronomic, policy,
information and physical constraints that form the domain FðxÞ. Important ele-
ments of the domain include the irrigable and agricultural area, which constrain
land use, and crop rotation, climatic conditions, know-how, water availability and
Common Agricultural Policy rules, which constrain land use change. The model
can be used to simulate the impact of structural policies that may lead to (dis)
investments, for example through annual and perennial tradeoffs or irrigation
modernization (see e.g., Gutiérrez-Martín and Gómez 2011); yet, such (dis)
investments are restricted in this exercise, given the short-term focus of irrigation
restrictions in the case study area.
Physical constraints include the water resources constraint, which can be
expressed as: Xn
i¼1
wixiha  Wg, ð6Þ
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
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where Wg is the water allotted to the agent in a given scenario g, ha is the land
allotment and wi are the water withdrawals necessary to irrigate crop xi.
The multi-attribute utility function in Eq. (1) is calibrated by using revealed
preference techniques. The RPM follows a positive approach, meaning that the
solution to the above problem is the observed crop mix actually chosen by the
farmer, denoted by x○. The RPM aims to elicit a utility function that is consistent
with the observed crop mix and the choice domain.
3.2. Calibration
By using standard microeconomic theory, the objective function parameters can be
elicited for every possible combination of attributes within a ﬁnite set equalizing
the Marginal Rate of Transformation (MRTkp), i.e., the opportunity cost of trading
off one unit of attribute zk for one unit of attribute zp (the slope of the efﬁcient
frontier), and the Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRSkp), i.e., the willingness to
give up one unit of attribute zk in exchange for a unit of attribute zp (the slope of the
indifference curve of the utility function).
MRTkp ¼ MRSkp ¼ 
@U=@zp
@U=zk
; p, k 2 ð1, . . . ,mÞ; p 6¼ k: ð7Þ
The multi-attribute utility function is calibrated in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, a
method to reveal the efﬁcient frontier for each pair of attributes by using numerical
methods is presented, and the MRTkp estimated. In the second step, the parameters
of the utility function for every possible combination of attributes within the
chosen (and ﬁnite) set of attributes are elicited by equalizing the MRTkp and
MRSkp. The relevant attributes are those that minimize the distance between ob-
served and simulated decisions.
3.2.1. Efﬁcient frontier and tangency point
In order to calibrate the objective function, the efﬁcient frontier needs to be de-
ﬁned. The efﬁcient frontier represents the maximum level of attributes that agents
can attain within the space of feasible decisions FðxÞ. The efﬁcient frontier cannot
be deﬁned with a closed function, and is obtained instead through numerical
methods using an optimization procedure. For a ﬁnite number of values c ¼
ð0, . . . , 1Þ of a given attribute zkðxÞ, this procedure ﬁnds the set of feasible crop
decisions that maximize the value of attribute zpðxÞ (p 6¼ kÞ.
Max zpðxÞ
x
ð8Þ
s:t: : zkðxÞ ¼ c 8k 6¼ p c ¼ ð0, . . . , 1Þ ð9Þ
Economic Impacts of Irrigation-Constrained Agriculture in the Lower Po Basin
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0  xi  1, ð10ÞXn
i¼1
xi ¼ 1, ð11Þ
x 2 FðxÞ: ð12Þ
The result is an efﬁcient frontier in the two-dimensional space deﬁned by zp , zkðX f Þ,
whereX f is the set of crop portfolios located along the frontier for attributes zpzk. The
efﬁcient frontier has to be convex — otherwise one of the attributes has no oppor-
tunity cost in terms of the other, which means that it is not utility-relevant and can be
therefore excluded. In practice, this means that an increase in, say, expected income
must come along with a reduction in, say, income security (Just 1975). The slope of
the efﬁcient frontier or MRTkp offers the information necessary to obtain the tan-
gency point for the calibration of the utility function.
There are several methods that can be used to ﬁnd tangency points along the
frontier (Gómez-Limón et al. 2016; Gutiérrez-Martín and Gómez 2011). In this
paper, we use a projection method (Gutiérrez-Martín et al. 2014; Gutiérrez-Martín
and Gómez 2011), in which the optimization problem in Eqs. (8)–(12) is solved for
the observed values of zkðxÞ, i.e., zkðxÞ ¼ c ¼ z○k ðxÞ. Projecting the observed crop
portfolio zp, zkðx○Þ to the efﬁcient frontier yields two points, namely zp, z○k ðxf Þ
and  ○zp, zkðxf Þ. The slope between the two projected points approximates the
MRTkp and is used as the tangency point for the calibration of the utility function in
the next subsection. (Fig. 3).
Figure 3. Efﬁcient Frontier and Tangency Point
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
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Provided that agents are rational individuals who aim at maximizing their utility
within the domain, and by means of a positive approach that equalizes the optimal
and observed decisions, the observed crop mix zp, zkðx○Þ and the frontier must be
close, and so must the projected points zp, z
○
k ðxf Þ and  ○zp, zkðxf Þ. The projection
method reduces the approximation error as compared to other alternatives (André
et al. 2010; André and Riesgo 2007), but still yields an error that is measured by
using calibration residuals (see next section).
3.2.2. Utility function speciﬁcation and parameters
A Cobb–Douglas speciﬁcation was chosen for the utility function. Unlike alter-
native additive or multiplicative-additive speciﬁcations, Cobb–Douglas speciﬁca-
tions have a decreasing marginal utility for each attribute and yield a global
optimum (Inada 1963). The Cobb–Douglas parameters are estimated as follows:
 @U=@zp
@U=zk
¼  αp
αk
zk
zp
¼ MRTkp, ð13Þ
Xm
p¼1
αp ¼ 1, ð14Þ
this system is resolved for every possible combination within the ﬁnite set of
attributes, and thus the parameters of the related utility functions are elicited. The
calibrated utility functions that result are used to obtain their corresponding opti-
mum crop portfolio (x*) and attributes (z*p; p ¼ 1, . . . ,mÞ.
The positive approach used in RPM implies that the relevant attributes are those
that more accurately resemble the observed behavior of the agent. Accuracy is
assessed through calibration residuals that measure the distance between the value
of observed and calibrated variables. The ﬁrst calibration residual measures the
distance between the observed and optimum (calibrated) crop mix:
ex ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
n
Xn
i¼1
x○i  x*i
x○i
 2vuut : ð15Þ
The second calibration residual measures the distance between the observed and
optimum (calibrated) attributes:
e ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
m
Xm
p¼1
z○p  z*p
z
0
p
 !2vuut : ð16Þ
Economic Impacts of Irrigation-Constrained Agriculture in the Lower Po Basin
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The ordinary arithmetic mean of the two metrics above is the average calibration
residual:
e ¼ ex þ e
2
: ð17Þ
The combination of attributes that minimizes this error is the relevant one, and its
corresponding utility function is used in the simulation runs.
3.3. Empirical model and data
Based on a literature review of multi-attribute utility functions (Bergevoet et al.
2004; Binswanger 1982; Chung and Lee 2009; Delforce and Hardaker 1985;
Gómez-Limón and Riesgo 2004; Hazell and Scandizzo 1977a,b; Just 1975; Läpple
and Kelley 2013; Lynne 1995; Poppenborg and Koellner 2013; Rausser and
Yassour 1981; Rodrigues et al. 2013), ﬁve attributes are explored. The ﬁrst attri-
bute considered is proﬁt, the sole variable explaining the agent’s behavior and
response in single-attribute models, which is captured through expected income.
Using the ﬁrst moment of income distribution, we capture the inability of the agent
to anticipate with certainty realized yields or prices. Proﬁt (z1) is obtained in this
application of the model as a function of the per hectare gross margin i:
z1ðxÞ ¼
X
i
xii: ð18Þ
The crop mix decision is comparable to choosing a portfolio of ﬁnancial assets, in
which the agent must balance assets with low expected return and risk (say treasury
bonds or subsidized crops) and those with high expected return and volatility (say
stock shares or vegetables). The portfolio composition will ultimately depend on
the agent’s attitude toward risk. The utility-relevance of risk attitudes has been
repeatedly reported in the literature and is represented in this application of the
model through avoided risk (z2):
z2ðxÞ ¼ xVCVððxÞÞx x VCVððxÞÞx, ð19Þ
where VCVððxÞÞ is the variance and covariance matrix of z1ðxÞ and VCVððxÞÞ is
the variance and covariance matrix of z1ðxÞ.
However, it is possible that risk aversion and proﬁt maximization alone are
insufﬁcient to explain the observed agent’s behavior, resulting in a signiﬁcant gap
between the observed crop mix and the frontier. In this case, additional attributes
are necessary in order to achieve a satisfactory explanation of the agent’s behavior
and accurately predict his responses. The problem at this stage resides in the
qualitative nature of many of these attributes, which may complicate their
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
1750003-14
W
at
er
 E
co
ns
. P
ol
ic
y 
20
18
.0
4.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.
co
m
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 C
O
LL
EG
E 
LO
N
D
O
N
 (U
CL
) o
n 0
7/0
2/1
9. 
Re
-us
e a
nd
 di
str
ibu
tio
n i
s s
tri
ctl
y n
ot 
pe
rm
itte
d, 
ex
ce
pt 
for
 O
pe
n A
cc
ess
 ar
tic
les
.
measurement and demand the use of proxy variables. This is so regarding
avoidance of management complexities, or management easiness, which is often
cited in the literature as the third most relevant attribute explaining the agent’s
behavior. In this application of the model, three attributes capturing management
complexity aversion, or management easiness, are considered, namely: total labor
avoidance, hired labor avoidance and direct cost avoidance. There is no risk of
correlation among attributes, since the outcome of the utility function is an ordinal
value (Edgeworth 1881). This means that the model is not concerned about total
utility or levels of utility, but rather about ranking alternative decisions coherent
with observed choices:
– Total labor avoidance (z3):
z3ðxÞ ¼ NðxÞ  NðxÞ, ð20Þ
where NðxÞ ¼Pi xiNi are the total labor requirements for producing the crop mix
x, NðxÞ ¼PixiNi are the total labor requirements for producing the crop mix x,
and Ni is the total labor per hectare (daily wages) of crop i.
– Hired labor avoidance (z4):
z4ðxÞ ¼ HðxÞ  HðxÞ, ð21Þ
where HðxÞ ¼Pi xiHi are the hired labor requirements for producing the crop
portfolio x, HðxÞ ¼PixiHi are the hired labor requirements used for producing
the proﬁt maximizing crop mix x, and Hi is the hired labor per hectare (daily
wages) of crop i.
– Direct cost avoidance per unit of revenue (z5):
z5ðxÞ ¼ DðxÞ  DðxÞ, ð22Þ
where DðxÞ ¼Pi xiDi are the direct costs per unit of revenue incurred in the
production of the crop mix x, DðxÞ ¼PixiDi are the direct costs per unit of
revenue incurred in the production of the proﬁt maximizing crop mix x, and Di are
the direct costs per hectare of crop i.
The model is ﬂexible and could be used to explore additional attributes by using
the same calibration method explained above. For example, it could be informative
to explore the role of climate, weather and market forecasts on agents’ behavior.
This is nonetheless limited by the availability of data, which ultimately constrained
the use of these attributes in our case study area. It is worth noting that the
inclusion of additional variables does not guarantee a more accurate calibration and
results. Only if attributes are relevant in explaining agents’ decisions could errors
be reduced and accuracy improved.
Economic Impacts of Irrigation-Constrained Agriculture in the Lower Po Basin
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The model is calibrated by using data from ER Statistica (2016) (land use and
yields), ISMEA (2016) (market prices), INEA, 2016 (family and hired labor, other
costs, subsidies and other revenues), ISTAT 2013 (water use and irrigation efﬁ-
ciency). Data are available for 55 crops and 70.4% of the case study area during the
period 1996–2011. Prices base year is 2000, as in the MRIA model, and the
calibration year (observed crop portfolio) is 2014.
3.4. Simulation of irrigation restrictions
Once the multi-attribute utility function is calibrated, Eqs. (1)–(6) can be used to
assess agents’ responses to a speciﬁc water policy or shock. In this particular
exercise, a series of simulations is run in which water withdrawals Wg in Eq. (6)
are reduced by 0–50% at 1% intervals (g ¼ 0, . . . , 50). For every simulation
scenario, agents reassess their decisions and ﬁnd the optimal crop mix (x*) and its
corresponding attributes (z*p; r ¼ 1, . . . ,m). This information can be used to esti-
mate the Gross Value Added (GVA) of the agricultural sector in the LPRB (Y RPMg ),
a function of available water:
Y RPMg ¼ f ðWgÞ: ð23Þ
The simulation takes place at the beginning of the irrigation season, when
farmers can adjust their crop portfolio. Admittedly, this is not always the case —
restrictions could appear, or be further strengthened, when crop decisions have
already been made. This uncertainty is known by agents, who base their crop mix
choice on the expected income and its variability, which are also conditioned by
past droughts. This also means that the output of the simulation shows expected
values that may not correspond to the realized impacts of the drought, which may
be higher (if drought conditions worsen) or lower (if drought conditions improve).
The output in Eq. (23) is transformed to produce the inputs for the macroeco-
nomic simulation. For each simulation run g, a productivity shock g is obtained as
a function of the ratio between the estimated GVA and the GVA in the baseline
(g ¼ 0):
g ¼ γ
Y RPMg
Y RPM0
, ð24Þ
where γ is a ﬁxed coefﬁcient capturing the share of agricultural GVA that the
case study area (LPRB) represents in its corresponding region (Emilia Romagna
Region).
The productivity shock offers aggregated information at a NUTS2 level and can
be used as an input to conduct simulations in regionally calibrated macroeconomic
models such as the MRIA model (Koks et al. 2015).
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
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4. The MultiRegional Impact Assessment Model
4.1. Model basics
The MRIA model is employed to calculate the regional impacts in both the affected
and surrounding regions. The model was originally developed for the entire Eu-
ropean Union, consisting of 256 NUTS 2 regions, 59 products and 14 sectors
(Koks and Thissen 2016), following the European Classiﬁcation of Products by
Activity (Nace 1.1 – CPA 2002). For the purpose of this paper, only the 20 Italian
regions are considered, and the rest of Europe is aggregated into a single unit.
More speciﬁcally, all imports from all other EU regions are aggregated in one row
and all exports to other EU regions are aggregated in one column.
This model allows for an endogenously determined new post-disaster optimum
with shifts between main suppliers within the boundaries of the existing (trade and)
production structure of the (regional) economy. The objective function of the
model, Eq. (25), minimizes total production over all regions. More speciﬁcally,
each industry in each region aims to minimize its costs under a Walras–Leontief
production function, per input, per industry and per region, given the demand for
products and the available technologies to produce the products. These technolo-
gies describe how industries can make a mix of products out of a speciﬁc set of
inputs (the Leontief production function). Technologies are “owned” by the dif-
ferent industries in the different regions and are therefore available only to them.
The mix of inputs that each industry requires to make its speciﬁc mix of products
represents its production technology and is described by the use table (which
describes how many inputs an industry uses to create products). The mix of
products that each industry can make by using this technology is described in the
supply table (see Appendix 2 for an illustration of the type of multiregional sup-
ply-use table used in this study). The complete MRIA Model can be described by
the following set of equations, with t ¼ time, with l ¼ 1, . . . , L, with L ¼ number
of products, with g and h ¼ 1, . . . , I, with I ¼ number of industries, r ¼ 1, . . . ,N
and with s ¼ 1, . . . ,N, with N ¼ number of NUTS2 regions. Appendix A includes
a full list of all variables and their description.
Min zt ¼
X
g, r
qg, r, t, ð25Þ
s:t: :sr, t  ðI  bηrÞður, t þ fr, t þ r, tÞ $r, t þ eEUr, t þ eworldr, t , ð26Þ
$r, t ¼ Max½0, ðI  bηrÞður, t þ fr, t þ r, tÞ þ eEUr, t þ eworldr, t  δsmaxr, t , ð27Þ
eEUr, t ¼
X
s
Tssðus, t þ fs, t þ s, tÞ þ
X
s
Tss$s, t, ð28Þ
Economic Impacts of Irrigation-Constrained Agriculture in the Lower Po Basin
1750003-17
W
at
er
 E
co
ns
. P
ol
ic
y 
20
18
.0
4.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.
co
m
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 C
O
LL
EG
E 
LO
N
D
O
N
 (U
CL
) o
n 0
7/0
2/1
9. 
Re
-us
e a
nd
 di
str
ibu
tio
n i
s s
tri
ctl
y n
ot 
pe
rm
itte
d, 
ex
ce
pt 
for
 O
pe
n A
cc
ess
 ar
tic
les
.
where:
qg, r, t  0, qg, r, t  qmaxg, r, t,$g, r, t  0, g, r, t  0, ð29Þ
sr, t ¼ Crqr, t, smaxr, t ¼ Crqr, t, ð30Þ
ur, t ¼ Brqr, t, ð31Þ
ηr ¼ ðbmEUr þ bmworldr Þðubaser þ f baser Þ1 ð32Þ
r ¼ ðbmEUr Þðubaser þ f baser Þ1: ð33Þ
The MRIA model assumes, in line with standard IO modeling, a demand-deter-
mined economy. More speciﬁcally, demand from all Italian regions and the rest of
the world has to be satisﬁed by the total supply in all regions and the rest of the
world. This implies that if there is a supply restriction in a region (i.e., reduced
production as a result of a drought), the model aims to substitute to a non-affected
supplier to satisfy demand. The supply of products in all regions should be equal to
or larger than the demand for these products from all regions [Eq. (26)]. The
possibility of supply being larger than demand is an essential element in the model,
which allows for modeling inefﬁciencies in the economy due to limits in the
production capacity in the disaster affected area. The production in all regions will
take place at the lowest possible costs (industries minimize costs), given demand,
the available technologies and the maximum capacity of industries. The vector$r, t
deﬁnes the required additional imports of the affected regions from other regions to
satisfy the demand for products which cannot be satisﬁed because of lost pro-
duction capacity in their own regions [Eq. (27)]. The last term in Eq. (27) consists
of the maximum capacity of a region to produce goods, given the available pro-
duction technologies. Factor δ describes to what extent the regions will exhaust all
of their technology to produce a product in demand before it starts to import
additional products. If δ equals one, the region will only start importing a product
when all possible technologies have been used, with very large inefﬁciencies as a
consequence. Finally, Eq. (28) closes the model by ensuring that additional imports
due to limits in regional production capacity or increased production are produced
by the exporting regions.
4.2. Simulation of irrigation restrictions
A speciﬁc event that represents an economic disruption is modeled by reducing the
maximum capacity of the affected sector(s). In the case of a drought, the maximum
capacity of the agricultural sector is reduced and will become binding for the
affected sector in the affected region. This is shown in Eq. (4), where y is Value
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
1750003-18
W
at
er
 E
co
ns
. P
ol
ic
y 
20
18
.0
4.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.
co
m
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 C
O
LL
EG
E 
LO
N
D
O
N
 (U
CL
) o
n 0
7/0
2/1
9. 
Re
-us
e a
nd
 di
str
ibu
tio
n i
s s
tri
ctl
y n
ot 
pe
rm
itte
d, 
ex
ce
pt 
for
 O
pe
n A
cc
ess
 ar
tic
les
.
Added and ¾ the productivity shock as a result of the drought in the agricultural
sector.
ymaxr, t ¼ yr, tðI  br, tÞ: ð34Þ
In the MRIA model, there are two ways in which the supply for products can be
increased to satisfy the remaining demand. First, the model aims to increase the
production in sectors in the affected region that are not at their maximum capacity
but can produce the product in demand as a by-product. For the agricultural sector,
this effect is, however, limited. An agricultural product is often the core activity of
a company, and never the by-product of another production process. However, if a
different sector is able to take over some of the production, inefﬁciencies in the
economy will occur as these products are no longer made by the best possible
technology (i.e., we assume that the sector that originally produces the product
produces the most efﬁcient one of its kind). Second, imports to the region with an
excess demand can be increased. The option to increase imports of a certain
product is only used when the combined maximum capacity of the total of all
sectors that can produce this product is unable to satisfy the demand. These in-
efﬁciencies make the model different from IO and CGE models that impose
equality between demand and supply and therefore do not deal with these types of
inefﬁciencies. In the MRIA model, these inefﬁciencies result in unnecessary
byproducts not in demand that are supplied to the market. The latter should
therefore be interpreted as additional costs for the producer. It should be noted that
these inefﬁciencies occur at the regional level and not at the industry level; they are
caused by the limited available technologies and associated machinery, given the
demand for products in a region after a disaster.
The distribution of imports from other regions is determined by a ﬁxed pro-
portion, which is in line with standard multiregional IO models (see e.g., Miller
and Blair 2009). It should be noted that large disasters may result in large addi-
tional imports which may cause exporting regions, not directly hit by the disaster,
to reach the maximum capacity for certain industries. This is endogenously
determined in the model.
4.3. Data
The MRIA model uses a regionalized version for Italy of the European multire-
gional supply and use table, developed by PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency (Thissen et al. 2014). The multiregional supply and use tables
are built around 59 product categories which cover both goods and services fol-
lowing the European Classiﬁcation of Products by Activity (Nace 1.1 - CPA 2002).
Economic Impacts of Irrigation-Constrained Agriculture in the Lower Po Basin
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The data sources used to construct the dataset are (1) the national accounts of 25
EU countries, (2) international trade data on goods from Feenstra et al. (2005) and
services from Eurostat (2009a,b), (3) regional information on production, invest-
ment and consumption made available via Cambridge Econometrics (2008), (4)
information on freight transport among European regions from the Dutch Ministry
of Infrastructure and the Environment (2007) and (5) ﬁrst and business class airline
ticket information from SEO (2010).
5. Results
5.1. Calibration
Table 1 presents the calibration results (i.e., the value of the Cobb–Douglas utility
function parameters or αp) and the corresponding calibration residuals for the ADs
of the LPRB, by using the RPM and the multi-attribute utility function. Of the ﬁve
attributes explored (see Sec. 3.3), only three are found relevant in explaining
farmers’ decisions, namely proﬁt (z1, corresponding parameter: α1), risk avoidance
(z2, corresponding parameter: α2) and total labor avoidance (z3, corresponding
parameter: α3). Proﬁt and risk avoidance are relevant in all 30 ADs, while total
labor avoidance is relevant in explaining the behavior of 18 ADs. Variability in the
values of the parameters reﬂects the heterogeneity of the LPRB. For example, a
representative farmer of Colline di Bolgona is close to proﬁt maximizing
(α1 ¼ 0:989), with risk avoidance (α2 ¼ 0:011) having a minor yet signiﬁcant role
in explaining his/her behavior. On the other hand, the behavior of a representative
farmer of Pianura di Reggio Emilia is largely explained by his/her avoidance of
management complexities (α3 ¼ 0:254), which typically relates to ADs with a
traditional agricultural structure (large shares of corn and wheat in the case of the
Emilia Romagna area). Larger risk aversion coefﬁcients such as those observed in
Alto Reno (α2 ¼ 0:165) and Pianura di Modena (α3 ¼ 0:155) show a higher
willingness to sacriﬁce the provision of other attributes if this contributes to lim-
iting risk. If agents shared the same domain (set of restrictions), ADs with a higher
α1, α2 and α3 would display crop portfolios with a higher proﬁt, risk avoidance and
management complexities than others, respectively.
Average calibration residuals display satisfactory metrics for performance
evaluation below 10% (Pérez-Blanco et al. 2016).
5.2. Simulation
5.2.1. Microeconomic simulation
The microeconomic simulation reduces irrigation withdrawals by 0–50% at 1%
intervals (g ¼ 0, . . . , 50) and assesses agents’ responses, resolving the optimization
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
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problem in Eqs. (1)–(6) by using the objective functions calibrated in the previous
section. In order to continue irrigating high value added crops, farmers relinquish
marginal water uses, which typically correspond to crops characterized by lower
gross margin, labor intensity and GVA. Figure 4 presents, for each AD in the
LPRB and selected irrigation restriction scenarios, GVA losses measured as a
percentage of the GVA in the baseline (g ¼ 0).
Aggregate losses in the LPRB range between 0.14% GVA (scenario g ¼ 1)
and 16.01% (g ¼ 50) of LPRB’s GVA in the baseline (g ¼ 0). In some ADs,
losses can be as large as 22.8% of the GVA when irrigation withdrawals are
Table 1. RPM Calibration Results and Residuals
Agricultural District Parameter Calibration residuals
Nr. Name α1 (%) α2 (%) α3 (%) e (%) ex (%) e (%)
1 Montagna del Medio Trebbia 99.90 0.10 0.00 3.50 0.10 1.80
2 Alto Nure 94.00 1.00 4.70 1.40 7.00 4.20
3 Colline del Trebbia e del Tidone 81.30 4.90 13.80 4.50 2.00 3.30
4 Colline del Nure e dell’Arda 84.50 3.70 11.70 4.30 3.90 4.10
5 Pianura di Piacenza 87.50 1.90 10.60 0.90 0.00 0.50
6 Basso Arda 75.10 0.70 24.20 1.80 4.70 3.30
7 Alto Taro 97.60 2.40 0.00 0.50 0.10 0.30
8 Alto Parma 98.80 0.70 0.50 0.60 0.10 0.40
9 Colline di Salsomaggiore 75.40 8.70 15.90 0.30 0.10 0.20
10 Medio Parma 98.90 1.10 0.00 2.90 4.00 3.50
11 Pianura di Busseto 86.30 1.00 12.70 0.10 3.80 2.00
12 Pianura di Parma 86.10 1.30 12.60 0.90 6.00 3.50
13 Montagna tra l’Alto Enza e Alto Dolo 99.20 0.80 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.10
14 Colline tra Enza e Secchia 99.50 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.10 0.20
15 Bassa Reggiana 76.30 1.40 22.30 2.10 7.00 4.60
16 Pianura di Reggio Emilia 68.30 6.20 25.40 2.60 10.40 6.50
17 Valli del Dragone e del Rossenna 79.60 0.50 19.90 3.60 2.00 2.80
18 Alto Panaro 86.30 13.70 0.00 3.30 9.60 6.50
19 Colline Modenesi 88.90 11.10 0.00 3.70 8.30 6.00
20 Bassa Modenese 80.70 4.80 14.50 0.50 2.70 1.60
21 Pianura di Carpi 82.60 10.60 6.80 1.30 6.60 4.00
22 Pianura di Modena 84.50 15.50 0.00 1.20 5.40 3.30
23 Montagna del Medio Reno 97.20 2.80 0.00 3.30 9.00 6.20
24 Alto Reno 83.50 16.50 0.00 2.30 0.10 1.20
25 Colline di Bologna 98.90 1.10 0.00 4.20 9.90 7.10
26 Colline del Reno 99.00 1.00 0.00 5.70 7.00 6.40
27 Pianura a sinistra del Reno 80.80 7.10 12.10 1.10 7.40 4.30
28 Pianura di Ferrara 80.70 2.80 16.50 1.30 1.40 1.40
29 Boniﬁca Ferrarese Occidentale 82.90 9.40 7.70 2.00 11.40 6.70
30 Boniﬁca Ferrarese Orientale 85.80 3.60 10.60 2.70 14.00 8.40
Economic Impacts of Irrigation-Constrained Agriculture in the Lower Po Basin
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reduced by 35%, and hit 40.3% when irrigation withdrawals are halved. The
RPM provides valuable information on the magnitude and distribution of impacts
below the regional level. For example, a 50% reduction of irrigation withdrawals
reduces GVA by EUR 78/ha both in the ADs of Boniﬁca Ferrarese Orientale and
theMontagna del Medio Trebbia; nonetheless, in Boniﬁca Ferrarese Orientale this
ﬁgure represents less than 6% of the GVA in the baseline, and almost 33% in the
Montagna del Medio Trebbia. This is explained by the fact that Boniﬁca Ferrarese
Orientale has a signiﬁcant surface of water intensive and low value added crops
(mostly rice), and farmers relinquish these marginal water uses to irrigate crops
with a higher value added. In comparison, most crops available in the Montagna
del Medio Trebbia have a more modest and evenly distributed value added, and
there is no such pool of water resources allotted to water intensive and lower value
added crops that farmers can draw upon. This divergence between absolute loss
and its relative impact is observable throughout the basin: while relative GVA
losses are more signiﬁcant in the southern and western areas of the LPRB, absolute
losses are in general larger in the proﬁtable ADs downstream. This information can
serve to balance cost-effectiveness and equity issues across ADs in the imple-
mentation of irrigation restrictions.
Irrigation restrictions in the Po River Basin District are based on a proportional
rule that relinquishes a predetermined percentage of the water allotment from
farmers, sometimes in disregard of the economic losses involved (Mysiak et al.
2014; PRBDA 2015). Revising this allocation rule can enhance cost-effectiveness
Figure 4. GVA losses (%, 2000 prices) for Selected Irrigation Restrictions
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
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and equity, but it can also be contested by some parties, incur large transaction
costs5 and be infeasible in the short to medium term. The macroeconomic simu-
lation that follows aims to illustrate the economic implications of current drought
management and follows a proportional rule. This information can be used as a
benchmark to assess other reallocation rules that may be explored by policy-
makers, including possible institutional arrangements for trading water between
regions, which could also be evaluated by extending the methods presented in this
work. Figure 5 shows the tradeoffs between water conservation and GVA losses in
the LPRB for all simulation runs, following a proportional rule for irrigation
restrictions.
As the water availability constraint is strengthened, trading off GVA for water
conservation becomes costlier (rising incremental losses). A hypothetical water
conservation (irrigation restriction) target of 25Mm3 (6.5%) would cost EUR 0.26/
m3; 50Mm3, EUR 0.29/m3; 100Mm3, EUR 0.33/m3; and 150Mm3, EUR 0.41/m3.
5.2.2. Macroeconomic simulation
GVA estimations in the microeconomic model (Y RPMg ) provide the necessary in-
formation to calculate the productivity shock that feeds macroeconomic simula-
tions (g). The productivity shock ﬁrst reproduces the GVA losses forecast by the
5Transaction costs include the resources used to deﬁne the problems that institutions are intended to
solve and to change institutions and organizations (Marshall 2013).
Figure 5. Tradeoffs in Irrigation Restrictions: Water Conservation versus GVA Losses (2000 Prices)
in the LPRB
Economic Impacts of Irrigation-Constrained Agriculture in the Lower Po Basin
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RPM, only this time in a macroeconomic context. The MRIA model then looks for
a new equilibrium and estimates, for every irrigation restriction scenario, the
impacts on sectorial and regional GVA. Figure 6 presents the sectorial disaggre-
gation of the impacts of irrigation restrictions in the Emilia Romagna Region,
where the LPRB is located. For the sake of simplicity, the results produced by the
model for the 15 economic sectors considered are aggregated and presented in
Fig. 6 for ﬁve groups, namely: S1 (agriculture); S3 (food, beverages and tobacco),
S5 (coke, reﬁned petroleum, nuclear fuel and chemicals); S2, S4, S6 and S8
(mining, quarrying and energy supply; textiles and leather; electrical and optical
equipment; other manufacturing); and S9 to S15 (construction; distribution; hotels
and restaurants; transport, storage and communications; ﬁnancial intermediation;
real estate, renting and business activities; non-Market Services). Figure 7 dis-
plays, for selected scenarios, the impact irrigation restrictions have on the GVA of
the 20 Italian regions.
The Emilia Romagna Region, where the LPRB is located, is the region most
affected. Negative feedbacks amplify the initial shock and inﬂate GVA losses as
compared to the microeconomic simulation. Negative impacts are concentrated in
the agricultural sector (S1), whose GVA losses range between 22 M EUR
(0.66% agricultural GVA, scenario g ¼ 1) and 103.8 M EUR (3.1%,
g ¼ 50). The aggregation of sectorial impacts results in an overall reduction of the
GVA of the Emilia Romagna Region that ranges between 24.67 M EUR
(0.03% Emilia Romagna’s GVA, g ¼ 1) and 115.7 M EUR (0.12%, g ¼ 50).
GVA losses in the agricultural sector lead to disruptions in the food industry (S3)
Figure 6. Tradeoffs in Irrigation Restrictions: Water Conservation versus GVA Losses (2000 Prices)
in the Emilia Romagna Region
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
1750003-24
W
at
er
 E
co
ns
. P
ol
ic
y 
20
18
.0
4.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.
co
m
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 C
O
LL
EG
E 
LO
N
D
O
N
 (U
CL
) o
n 0
7/0
2/1
9. 
Re
-us
e a
nd
 di
str
ibu
tio
n i
s s
tri
ctl
y n
ot 
pe
rm
itte
d, 
ex
ce
pt 
for
 O
pe
n A
cc
ess
 ar
tic
les
.
through forward linkages (from 0.48 M EUR, or 0.02% of sector’s GVA, in
g ¼ 1 to 2.27 M EUR, or 0.1% in g ¼ 50), and in the chemical and reﬁnery
industry (S5) through backward linkages (from 0.47 M EUR, or 0.03% of its
GVA, in g ¼ 1 to 2.2 M EUR, or 0.07% in g ¼ 50). To a lesser extent, the
remaining economic sectors are also negatively impacted, with the exception of
electrical and optical equipment (S6) and Non-market services (S15), which ex-
perience marginal increases in the GVA.
The linkages that economic sectors from other Italian regions have with those in
Emilia Romagna, both as customers of outputs and/or supplier of inputs, are
affected by the contraction of production, which may result in production inefﬁ-
ciencies (see Section 4.3) that negatively affect the GVA. On the other hand, the
contraction of production in the Emilia Romagna Region results in an excess of
demand in the region that propels the production of substitute goods elsewhere in
Italy. The latter effect prevails in the macroeconomic assessment conducted in this
Figure 7. GVA losses (% of GVA in the Baseline) for Selected Irrigation Restrictions in Italian
Regions
Economic Impacts of Irrigation-Constrained Agriculture in the Lower Po Basin
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paper, which shows that irrigation restrictions in Emilia Romagna have a positive
impact on the GVA of other Italian regions, mostly through the production of
agricultural goods. Agricultural GVA in the rest of Italy increases between 6 M
EUR (þ0.02%, g ¼ 1) and 28.02 M EUR (þ0.11%, g ¼ 50). The regions most
beneﬁtted are Molise (þ0.001% total GVA in g ¼ 1, þ0.02% in g ¼ 50), Basi-
licata (from þ0.001% to þ0.013%), Sardinia (from þ0.001% to þ0.012%),
Calabria (from þ0.009% to þ0.02%) and Sicily (from þ0.001% to þ0.008%),
because of the importance of agriculture and other affected sectors in Emilia
Romagna, in their economy and the signiﬁcant trade relations with this region.
GVA growth nationwide compensates nearly 26.4% of GVA losses in Emilia
Romagna, although the aggregation of regional impacts still results in an overall
reduction of the Italian GVA that ranges between 18.08 M EUR (0.002%
Italian GVA, g ¼ 1) and 85.12 M EUR (0.009%, g ¼ 50). This outcome
highlights the capacity of the Italian economy to absorb a signiﬁcant part of the
damages caused to the agricultural output of a major region, and underpins the
rationale of solidarity policies in the face of natural disasters such as droughts.
When macroeconomic impacts are accounted for, trading GVA off for water
conservation becomes costlier as compared to the microeconomic simulation. For
example, while conserving 100Mm3 costs EUR 0.33/m3 in the microeconomic
simulation, this ﬁgure rises to EUR 0.42/m3 if nationwide impacts are considered,
and to EUR 0.57/m3 if only the impacts within the Emilia Romagna Region are
considered.
It is worth noting that drought is a systemic risk that can affect multiple regions
and basins at the same time. Basin-wide droughts demand basin-wide irrigation
rationing policies, possibly leading to larger direct and indirect impacts than those
estimated in this work. The regions where restrictions are applied could be
expected to concentrate the losses, while regions producing products to substitute
those affected by the drought would be most beneﬁtted. This paper aims to both
demonstrate and take a ﬁrst step toward the development of a basin-wide model
that delivers valuable insights into the economic impacts of major drought events
and sensible water policies.
5.3. Discussion
The EU Action on Water Scarcity and Droughts has called on policy makers to
develop instruments that address irrigation restrictions in a cost-effective and eq-
uitable manner, including water charges and complementary economic instruments
(e.g., crop insurance) (EC 2012). Yet, actual water scarcity and drought manage-
ment at a basin level involves a reactive and incremental strategy that largely
focuses on new supplies and improving the efﬁciency of existing ones, even in
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
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closed basins with inelastic supply (Schmidt and Benítez-Sanz 2012). When
droughts inevitably happen, command-and-control and/or DSC approaches are
typically used to deﬁne planned or ad-hoc irrigation restrictions, often following a
proportional rule that curtails a ﬁxed percentage of the water allotment from
farmers (Strosser et al. 2012).
The results obtained in the microeconomic simulation show that this is neither
cost-effective (productive uses can be affected), nor equitable (asymmetric
impacts). GVA losses at an AD level are ampliﬁed in the macroeconomic simu-
lation through negative feedbacks among the economic sectors of the Emilia
Romagna Region. This is partially but not fully compensated through GVA growth
in the rest of the Italian territory. On average, the GVA losses estimated for the
LPRB by using the microeconomic simulation represent 58.6% (Emilia Romagna)
and 79.7% (Italy) of the GVA losses estimated in the macroeconomic simulation
(Fig. 8).
This outcome highlights the importance of the inter-sectorial linkages within
and among regions. Yet, EU-wide studies analyzing the economic impact of
droughts largely focus on direct losses and ignore their broad economic reper-
cussions, both negative (negative feedbacks) and positive (substitution effect).
Consequently, available estimates that place annual losses in Europe from droughts
at EUR 6.2 billion are possibly biased and underestimated (Strosser et al. 2012).
One may argue that available macroeconomic models can be used to correct this
Figure 8. Tradeoffs in Irrigation Restrictions: Water Conservation versus GVA Losses (2000 Prices),
Micro- and Macroeconomic Simulations
Economic Impacts of Irrigation-Constrained Agriculture in the Lower Po Basin
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bias. On the other hand, the heterogeneous traditions, climate, orography, soils and
infrastructure of southern European regions often give rise to an intricate mosaic of
crops and management practices that makes it unrealistic to consider the agricul-
tural activity of a region as a single large agricultural entity. Furthermore, focusing
on aggregate quantities macroeconomic models misses the rationale behind the
behavior of farmers. Finally, the reallocation of resources in macroeconomic
models is often based on competition, while in Europe and most regions
worldwide water endowments are allotted according to criteria other than efﬁ-
ciency (e.g., historical rights, queuing), and water charges are set by the public
administrations — often in a rather intricate way.
Micro- and macroeconomic assessments complement each other and offer
valuable information for a better understanding of the magnitude and distribution
of the economic impacts of water resources management strategies. Limiting water
withdrawals in ADs with higher water productivity may have a signiﬁcant impact
on agricultural output and inﬂate the negative feedbacks on macroeconomic GVA
that result from inter-sectorial linkages. On the other hand, strengthening water
allocation constraints in those ADs with lower water productivity would reduce the
magnitude of local as well as broad economic losses, and a fraction of the GVA
losses prevented could be used to compensate those suffering restrictions. This
could be addressed, for example, through incremental charges and cross-subsidi-
zation, or alternatively through trading schemes in which buyers purchase water
resources to prevent the loss of high value added crops and sellers are compensated
for relinquishing (part of) their water allotment. While this may reduce the
abatement costs of droughts and contribute to mitigating negative distributive
impacts, transaction costs could be high and complementary estimations on their
impact would be necessary before deciding whether or not to advance in this or
another direction.
The exercise also makes it possible to identify those negatively and positively
affected by the policy. The asymmetric economic impacts on the agricultural
sector in Italy are addressed through the National Solidarity Fund (legislative
decree 102/2004), which provides compensatory measures to uninsurable crops
in case of exceptional atmospheric conditions and natural disasters, and is fed by
general taxation. Nonetheless, this mechanism offers partial compensation of
losses and does not address the broad economic repercussions of drought. Some
form of collaboration among regions within the same basin (in this case the PRB
as a whole) could be employed ex-ante to minimize total GVA losses. Irrigation
restrictions based on a basin-wide economic assessment would avoid or reduce
impacts on areas with higher water productivity. Regions negatively affected by
water limitations would then be compensated on the basis of the GVA losses
C. D. Perez-Blanco et al.
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prevented elsewhere. Currently, no institutional setting is in place to support this
kind of mechanism. However, the economic assessment could be used to inform
the (voluntary) decisions taken by the members of the DSC and to highlight the
distortions caused by non-cooperative behaviors. The analysis can be also used
to highlight the importance of water trading, as implemented in Australia and the
US, as a mechanism to enhance efﬁciency of water scarcity management.
6. Conclusions
Further research can expand the modeling framework assembled for the analysis
shown in this paper. One obvious extension is the inclusion of a hydrological
module. Related micro- and macroeconomic models offer valuable information on
the costs of irrigation restrictions and the distribution thereof; yet, a ﬁrst measure of
cost-effectiveness demands a hydrological model that quantiﬁes and localizes
physical water ﬂows in a way that accounts for system dynamics (e.g., river-
aquifer, return ﬂows, etc.). Hydrological modeling also provides the basic infor-
mation to measure the environmental beneﬁts that can be obtained from enhanced
water ﬂows through complementary non-market valuation methods. This offers a
ﬁrst measure of efﬁciency that could be used to better inform decision-making,
within the cost-effectiveness rationale that governs EU water policy. As a next step,
the authors intend to combine the economic models presented here with the hy-
drological model currently used to inform drought management in the Po River
Basin to develop a modular hydro-economic model comprising sound micro- and
macroeconomic principles.
Connecting multiple models inevitably ampliﬁes uncertainty, but there are ways
to limit this impact (Pindyck 2015). In the modular approach used in this research,
accuracy can be enhanced by minimizing uncertainty along the different models
involved (Ekström et al. 2013). In the case of the microeconomic model, alter-
native functional forms (instead of Cobb–Douglas) and methods to ﬁnd tangency
points along the frontier (instead of projection) could be explored in order to
reduce calibration errors and improve the model’s predictive capacity. Additional/
alternative attributes could also be explored for the same purpose — although this
is ultimately constrained by data availability in the case study area. In the mac-
roeconomic model, a more detailed temporal dimension may be included to also
consider the duration of the drought.
Finally, researchers need to make policy-makers aware of the limitations of
models and of what can and cannot be inferred from them. Opinions and debates
among experts and stakeholders, despite the degree of subjectivity they bring to the
decision-making processes, are still much needed in order to interpret and elaborate
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model speciﬁcations and outcomes. In turn, this interaction can help scientists to
address some model limitations and improve its accuracy and predictive capacity.
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Appendix A. MRIA Model — List of Variables and Deﬁnition
Endogenous Variables
xr, t½g Column vector of production of sector g in region r in time period t.
sr, t½p Column vector of supply of product p in region r in time period t.
ur, t½p Column vector of intermediate use for product p in region r in time period t.
f r, t ½p Column vector of Final demand for product p in region r in time period t.
eEUr, t ½p Column vector of export to the EU regions for product p in region r in time period t.
!r, t½p Additional imports needed to satisfy excess demand given the regional supply capacity
for product p in region r in time period t:
Exogenous variables and Parameters
Cr½p, g Regional supply matrix (in coefﬁcients) of sector i in region r producing product p. This
matrix is also known as the product mix matrix.
Br½p, g Regional use matrix (in coefﬁcients) of sector i in region r using product p from region r.
xmaxr, t ½i Column vector of maximal production capacity of sector i in region r in time period t:
r, t½p Column vector of reconstruction demand for product p in region r in time period t:
eworldr, t ½p Column vector of export to the rest of the world for product p from region r in time
period t:
mEUr ½p Import from other EU regions by r for product p in the base year 2000.
mworldr ½p Import from the rest of the world by region r for product p in the base year 2000.
Ts½r, p The trade matrix (in coefﬁcients) of products used in region s and demanded from region
r. These trade vectors are derived from trade data of the year 2000.
r½p The European import share for product p demanded from region r.
ηr½p The total import share (EU þ world) for product p demanded from region r.
δ Regional maximum capacity parameter. This parameter determines to what extent all
possible maximum production capacities of different industries can be added up to a
regional production capacity.
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Appendix B. MRIA Model – Supply-Use Table
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¾r, t ½g Vector of inoperability of sector i in region r in time period t. The inoperability is a ratio
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